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Demurrer: The Tennessee cases reiterate the orthodox proposition
that a demurrer admits the facts alleged or averred in the pleading to
which it is interposed.' It is perhaps unnecessary to note that this
proposition is true only when the problem concerns the sufficiency of
the allegations or averments in the pleading. In truth, the demurrer
is merely a default as to the facts and a tender of issue on the law.
If the demurrer is overruled and the action is for unliquidated dam-
ages, the plaintiff's averment as to the amount of the damages is not
taken as true; he must prove the amount. And if the demurrer to the
declaration is overruled and the defendant then answers by a denial,
the fact that he has previously demurred is not receivable in evidence
against him as an admission. The rule as to the effect of a demurrer
is applicable to bills in equity as well as to declarations at law. But
the admission "is strictly confined to the facts. It does not admit any
matters of law suggested in the bill, or inferred from the facts stated.
Upon the argument of a demurrer, the bill alone must be looked to
for the facts of the case, except such facts as the Court may judicially
know. The demurrer does not admit 'arguments, deductions, infer-
ences, or conclusions set forth in the bill.'" Thus, it does not admit the
conclusion of the pleader that the defendant "fraudulently procured
the enactment" of designated private acts or "coerced" certain county
judges to make specified payments under them.2 Although contribu-
tory negligence is an affirmative defense3 and although the Statute of
Frauds must be specially pleaded,4 if either of these defenses affirma-
tively appears on the face of the declaration or bill, it is demurrable.5
But if the declaration or bill also contains matter meeting and avoid-
ing the defense, it is sufficient against demurrer. 6
* Frank C. Rand Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Royall Professor
of Law Emeritus and former Acting Dean, Harvard Law School; Reporter,
A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence; co-editor, Morgan and Maguire, Cases and Ma-
terials on Evidence (3d ed. 1951).
1. See, e.g., Wilson v. Miller, 250 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. 1952).
2. State v. Hobbs, 250 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tenn. 1952); cf. Hayslip v. Bondu-
rant, 250 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1953) (petition for certiorari from decision of board
of education).
3. See Kingsul Theatres, Inc. v. Quillen, 29 Tenn. App. 248, 259, 196 S.W.2d
316, 320 (E.S. 1946).
4. Cobble v. Langford, 190 Tenn. 385, 391, 230 S.W.2d 194, 196 (1950); Citty
v. Manufacturing Co., 93 Tenn. 276, 24 S.W. 121 (1893).
5. McCampbell v. Central of Georgia Ry., 253 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1952)
(contributory negligence); Buice v. Scruggs Equipment Co., 250 S.W.2d 44
(Tenn. 1952) (statute of frauds).
6. Buice v. Scruggs Equipment Co., 250 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1952).
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Interpretation: Pleadings in general should be construed liberally,
and this is particularly true in workmen's compensation cases. Thus,
an allegation by plaintiff that her leg was severely injured to the ex-
tent of permanent disability should have been interpreted as including
an assertion of injury which aggravated a prior disease, and it was
error to exclude evidence tending to show the aggravated disability.7
But a plea in abatement, even in a criminal case, is to be strictly con-
strued. It is, of course, to be filed promptly. Thus, where the record
tended to show that the plea had not been filed until at least three
weeks after defendant had knowledge of the alleged irregularities,
the Court said: "While the plea states that it was filed at the first op-
portunity, and within the three week period, it is more or less un-
certain as to when, during that time, the irregularity was actually
discovered." It then accepted as settled law a statement in Chairs v.
State8 which included the following:- "The plea must exclude by
proper allegations and averment, every legal intendment or conclusion
that otherwise might be made against it by the court. It must appear
from its averments to have been filed at the earliest possible time....
And the rule is general that the greatest strictness prevails in the con-
struction and application of pleas in abatement." 9
Replication, Effect of Failure to File: In a suit brought by a county
judge pursuant to a statute authorizing him to bring suit for recovery
of a shortage in public funds, the bill showed that it was brought
under the statute and that counsel filing it had been selected by the
judge. A plea in abatement alleged lack of both authority and selec-
tion. No replication was required.10 The Court declared that in such
case the replication would have been surplusage. It did not indicate
whether the allegations in question were essential to the bill or were in
the nature of an anticipatory replication. But, in either event, it seems
clear that no replication would be required either under orthodox
equity practice or under the Code, which dispenses with replications
to answers and requires no special plea except to attack jurisdiction."
And in an action to recover on a fire insurance policy, plaintiff's failure
to file a replication to a plea in abatement was no ground of error
where the record showed that the parties proceeded to a hearing as
if a replication had been filed. 2
Set-Off and Counterclaims: Code section 874613 provides for un-
limited counterclaims in tort and contract "in actions or suits in which
a resident of another state and a resident of this state are adversary
7. Ledford v. Miller Bros. Co., 253 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1952).
8. 124 Tenn. 630, 644, 139 S.W. 711, 714 (1911).
9. Gray v. State, 250 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. 1952).
10. Smith v. State, 250 S.W.2d 55 (Tenn. 1952).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 10396, 10400 (Williams 1934).
12. Motors Ins. Corp. v. Lipford, 250 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1952).
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8746 (Williams 1934).
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parties." The Supreme Court interpreted this as not applying to litiga-
tion in chancery, even though the circuit court also would have had
jurisdiction to decide the particular case. This permitted a non-
resident to avoid a counterclaim in a contract action by suing in chan-
cery.14 This unhappy result has been made impossible in future contro-
versies by Chapter 144 of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1953.15
Need for further liberalization of the counterclaim statutes is indi-
cated in Julian Engineering Co. v. R. J. and C. W. Fletcher, Inc.
16 Com-
plainant sold defendant a prefabricated smokehouse for $6,000.00 on a
conditional sales contract. Defendant paid $2,000.00 in cash but failed
to make further payments. Complainant sought repossession of the
smokehouse but did not seek any money judgment. Defendant at-
tempted to set off or counterclaim for breach of warranties of fitness
and suitability. The Court held that recoupment and set-off are
properly allowed only where blaintiff is suing for money. That de-
fendant's claim arose out of the very transaction which is the subject
of the suit is immaterial. In this case, it happened that the plaintiff
was a foreign corporation. It did not appear whether defendant could
have qualified as a resident of Tennessee. If so, would the 1953 amend-
ment have made the counterclaim proper: "In cases in equity such
matters shall be set up by way of cross-bill."?
Amendment: Section 8711 of the Code 17 provides: "The court may
allow material amendments at any stage of the proceedings upon such
terms, and subject to such rules, as it may prescribe." And section
871318 forbids dismissal of a civil suit for want of necessary parties and
gives the court power to "strike out or insert in the writ and pleadings
the names of either plaintiffs or defendants, so as to have the proper
parties before the court .... " In Goodloe v. Puckett,19 plaintiff brought
action as administratrix of her husband's estate upon promissory notes
payable to him. Before action brought, she had been discharged as
administratrix and had become the sole owner of the notes. The ac-
tion was brought before the statutory period of limitations had expired.
After it had expired, plaintiff moved to amend her declaration so as
to make herself personally the plaintiff. The trial judge held that the
statute of limitations prevented the amendment. In a forceful opinion
by Chief Justice Neil, the Supreme Court reversed, saying in part:
"He [defendant] was before the court upon the averment in the dec-
laration that he was the maker of the notes; that they were due and
14. Hood Lumber Co. v. Five Points Lumber Co., 249 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn.
1952).
15. See 6 VAND. L. REV. 797 (1953).
16. 253 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. 1952).
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8711 (Williams 1934).
18. TExN. CODE ANN. § 8713 (Williams 1934).
19. 254 S.W.2d 745 (Tenn. 1953).
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unpaid. The notes were in the possession of the plaintiff and it was
wholly immaterial whether Mrs. Goodloe held them in her capacity
as administratrix or as the individual owner. The proposed amend-
ment added no new party and made no change in the cause of action.
'20
Lost Pleading: Where an original declaration has been lost, the
court may permit a copy to be filed in its stead.21
PARTIES
Action Challenging Right to Public Office: In an action to enjoin
a person who has been duly elected to a county office from taking that
office because he is ineligible to hold it, the proper party plaintiff is
the State on the relation of the Attorney General. Neither the present
incumbent of the office nor the taxpayers of the county may maintain
such action.22
Surviving Tort Action: In an action for damages caused by the
wrongful act of a person who dies before action brought, the proper
party defendant is the personal representative of the decedent. Con-
sequently, no action will lie until such personal representative exists.
An action brought against the wrongdoer's widow and children is
subject to .a plea in abatement. Incidentally, in Tennessee the circuit
court has no power in a law case to appoint an administrator ad litem.
23
Joinder: Where suit is brought on an officer's bond to recover short-
ages, as authorized by statute, it is proper to join the sureties on the
bond for the officer's second successive term with those on his bond
for the first term. This procedure enables the court to do equity be-
tween all the sureties.
24
REMEDIES
Intervention: Where plaintiff filed his bill in March for the recovery
of possession of property and in November following assigned his in-
terest to a third person, the trial judge properly allowed the assignee
to intervene. The defendant's rights were in no way affected by the
intervention. The original plaintiff, if successful, would secure pos-
session for the use and benefit of the intervenor.
25
Interpleader: As a result of a contract between the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Anderson County Board of Education, the United
States paid some $2,000,000.00 to the Board of Education, which turned
it over to the Trustee of Anderson County. A dispute between the
20. Id. at 746.
21. Chumbley v. Coffee County, 253 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
22. Bickford v. Swafford, 253 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. 1952).
23. Brooks v. Garner, 254 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. 1953).
24. Smith v. State, 250 S.W.2d 55 (Tenn. 1952).




County and the Board of Education as to the disposition of $117,000.00
out of the fund caused the Trustee to keep this amount in a special
fund. To determine what disposition should be made of it, the Trustee
interpleaded the County and the Board of Education. The chancellor
held that, since the funds were all turned over to the Board for defray-
ing the expenses of the Oak Ridge school system, the County had no
claim to any part of the fund or to any commission for handling it.
Neither party raised an issue as to the propriety of interpleader in
this situation.
26
Habeas Corpus: Where a trial court has committed a defendant to
jail for contempt in failure to obey its order to pay alimony and de-
fendant claims the order is unjustified because his failure was due to
inability to pay, defendant's remedy is not habeas corpus. His remedy
is by appeal to the Court of Appeals and then by petition for certiorari
to the Supreme Court. He cannot use the writ of habeas corpus as a
substitute for an appeal in due course.
27
Declaratory Judgment or Decree: In a previous proceeding for the
construction of a will, the parties reached an agreement which was
embodied in a consent decree that vested all of the testator's lands in
Mrs. B and ordered the personalty divided between Mrs. B and Mrs. P.
In a condemnation proceeding in the United States district court, all
funds representing the award for taking portions of the real estate
were claimed by Mrs. B, while Mrs. P claimed one-half of them. The
United States court ruled provisionally that they should be paid as
the state court decree provided. Mrs. B brought action for a declara-
tory judgment construing the original consent decree. The Court held
that the decree was ambiguous and that the controversy presented
a proper case under the Declaratory Judgment Act and upheld the
construction decreed by the chancellor.2 8 The case presents the in-
teresting problem whether in these circumstances the writing should
have been construed by the United States court, whose duty it was to
make the award in the condemnation case. As to this, the report
merely said that Mrs. P "had filed a petition in the United States Dis-
trict Court claiming an interest in these funds and that the matter had
been called to the attention of the United States District Judge and it
was agreeable to him to have the controversy disposed of in the Chan-
cery Court and an order entered in the Federal Court in accord with
the decree of the Chancellor in this case." Is this in effect another
consent order or decree in the United States court, or is it a practicable
device for the application of the Erie v. Tompkins doctrine?
Code section 883629 provides for an action for a declaratory judgment
26. Larue v. Anderson County, 253 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. 1952).
27. State v. Upchurch, 254 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. 1953).
28. Barnes v. Pierce, 253 S.W.2d 33 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8836 (Williams 1934).
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as to the validity of a statute or ordinance by any person whose rights
are affected by it. In Johnson City v. Caplan,30 Caplan was convicted
and fined in city court for violation of an ordinance. He appealed to
the circuit court, and, while the case was there pending, he filed in the
chancery court a petition to have the ordinance declared unconstitu-
tional. The chancellor overruled the demurrer of Johnson City and
held for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the
suit dismissed. In so doing, it acted in accord with the great weight of
authority. Any other result would pervert the purposes of the Declara-
tory Judgment Act. However liberally it should be interpreted, it
ought not to be construed to sanction interference with the progress of
a pending civil or criminal action in which the issue is identical with
that sought to be resolved by the declaratory proceeding.
PRisu vMi s
The customary loose use of the term "presumption," is found in the
Tennessee opinions. For example, there is said to be a presumption
that every citizen knows the law, but a county clerk and master could
not be presumed to know that a legislative act was unconstitutional
when the Supreme Court would presume it to be constitutional.31 Ob-
viously, what the Court is saying is that ignorance of the law is ordi-
narily no excuse for a violation of law but that this rule has no appli-
cation to a situation where a subordinate official obeys a statute which
might later be held unconstitutional. In an action to recover overtime
pay, the Court declared that the defendant company would be entitled
to a "prima facie presumption" that it had not violated the Wage
Stabilization Act in so far as the violation subjected it to criminal
penalties, yet as to civil penalties, "there is no presumption of inno-
cence, but in the absence of evidence showing a reason for violation,
it is a fair practical assumption that the law was not violated.1
32 It is
a bit difficult to see the difference between a prima facie presumption
and a fair practical assumption. And one wonders why a party is not
entitled to a presumption of innocence of a violation of a statute for
which a civil penalty is imposed. Is the distinction due to the fact that
the alleged wrongdoing was done by the defendant's superintendent
for which defendant was only vicariously responsible?
In Norbert Trading Co. v. Underwood,33 the Supreme Court made
clear the effect of two presumptions: (1) that the president of a cor-
poration has authority to endorse and transfer commercial paper pay-
able to the corporation and (2) that, under the Negotiable Instruments
Act, there has been a valid and intentional delivery of the instrument
30. 253 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1952).
31. State v. Hobbs, 250 S.W.2d 549 (Tenn. 1952).
32. Todd v. Roane-Anderson Co., 251 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
33. 253 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. 1952).
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to the holder of the instrument. The effect of the latter presumption
was to make inapplicable a long line of Tennessee decisions holding
that on a plea of non-assignavit the plaintiff had the burden of proving
title to the instrument sued on. Evidence to the contrary is required
to dissipate each presumption. Evidence is likewise required to remove
the presumption that a child under fourteen years of age is incapable
of negligence. When material evidence of his capacity is introduced,
the question is for the jury.34
There are many statements in Tennessee cases indicating that a pre-
sumption loses all efficacy in an action as soon as evidence is received
which would justify a jury in finding the nonexistence of the presumed
fact. But this rule, advocated by both Thayer and Wigmore, is honored
quite as much in breach as in observance. The presumption against
suicide is a striking example. In Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Prieto,35 the Court exhaustively reviewed all the authorities and in
effect concluded that the presumption did not disappear upon the in-
troduction of evidence tending to show suicide but, where "the proof
is equally balanced, or is conflicting, this presumption comes to the aid
of the plaintiff in making out his or her case."36 In Bryan v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co.,3 7 the Court said that it was unwilling to overrule its
previous cases and quoted from the Prieto case with approval. And the
Court of Appeals has followed the Prieto case in Maddux v. National
Life & Acc. Ins. Co.38
BuRDEN OF PROOF
Only two cases during the pertinent period involved the allocation
of the burden of proof. The one is entirely orthodox. A party relying
upon a former judgment as an estoppel or res judicata has the burden
of proving it, and, where the record in the former pleading does not
make it appear that the matter in question was adjudicated, evidence
aliunde must be produced.39 The other may be somewhat more ques-
tionable. Where defendant was. indicted for unlawfully possessing
unstamped whiskey, he had the burden of producing evidence and the
burden of persuading the jury that whiskey possessed by him was
stamped. Since he produced no such evidence, his conviction was af-
firmed.40 The Court cited only a case in which defendant insisted that
the prosecution must prove lack of a license to do an otherwise pro-
hibited act.41 The reasoning of the cited case was that it is entirely
34. Hadley v. Morris, 249 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951).
35. 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W.2d 251 (1935).
36. Id. at 168, 83 S.W.2d at 268.
37. 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85 (1939).
38. 254 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
39. Carter County v. Street, 252 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
40. Everhart v. State, 250 S.W.2d 368 (Tenn. 1952).
41. Knowling v. State, 176 Tenn. 56, 138 S.W.2d 416 (1940).
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proper to put upon the defendant in a criminal case the burden of
proving the existence of a fact peculiarly within his knowledge, even
where the nonexistence of that fact is an essential element of the of-
fense charged. This reasoning has frequently been advanced in the
license cases. But there are obvious limitations to its general appli-
cability.42
EviDECE
The decisions dealing with evidence are, for the most part, orthodox
in statement and in application. In situations where the admissibility
of an item of relevant evidence depends upon the determination of a
question of fact, the determination is made by the judge. Thus, in a
prosecution for homicide, it was for him to decide whether a statement
made by the victim was made while he was rational and while he had
the requisite realization of speedily impending death.43
Illegally Obtained Evidence: The doctrine of the United States Su-
preme Court governing the admissibility of evidence obtained through
search and seizure in violation of the Constitution is accepted in Ten-
nessee. Its application cannot be avoided by subterfuge. Where an
officer stopped an automobile on the pretext of examining defendant
driver's license, saw intoxicating liquor in the car and held the de-
fendant until a proper warrant was secured, the arrest and search were
illegal, and evidence found as a result was inadmissible.44 On the other
hand, if officers have sufficient information concerning the commission
of a felony to justify the arrest of defendant in his home, a search of
his room after the arrest is not in violation of the Constitution, and a
pistol found therein is receivable in evidence against him.45 A person
who accepts the privilege of taking wild life under a statute which re-
quires him to submit to inspection to ascertain whether the statutory
requirements are being observed cannot complain of a search which
reveals game illegally procured, and evidence of the results of the
search is admissible.46 Even though intoxicants procured through il-
legal search have been erroneously admitted against the defendant in
a prosecution for their illegal possession, if he thereafter takes the
stand and admits possession, the error is "cured.47
Other Crimes: A few states have accepted the American Law Insti-
tute's analysis that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible only where
its relevance is by way of inference from the criminal act to disposi-
42. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 54 Sup. Ct. 281, 78 L. Ed. 664
(1934).
43. Helton v. State, 255 S.W.2d 694 (Tenn. 1953).
44. Murphy v. State, 254 S.W.2d 979 (Tenn. 1953).
45. Williamson v. State, 250 S.W.2d 556 (Tenn. 1952).
46. Monroe v. State, 253 S.W.2d 734 (Tenn. 1952).
47. Burks v. State, 254 S.W.2d 970 (Tenn. 1953).
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tion to commit such acts and thence to the commission of the act
charged. Tennessee adheres to the usual statement that such evidence
is inadmissible, subject to a group of exceptions. These include situa-
tions where evidence of the other crimes shows motive or otherwise
tends to prove the crime charged. Thus, where the charge was an at-
tempt to bribe an officer not to perform his duty, evidence that the
defendant was engaged in a "numbers racket" was admissible to show
his motive and the objective to be accomplished by the bribe.48 And
where the other criminal acts constitute a part of the transaction in
which the crime charged was committed, the excluding generalization
has no application. For example, in an action to enjoin a liquor
nuisance, evidence of specific illegal acts connecting defendant with the
possession and sale of whiskey was properly received.49 And where
the act charged was the shooting of A, evidence of the shooting of B
and C at the same time and place was admissible.50
The reason for excluding such evidence is not its lack of relevance
but the fact that its slight logical value in the usual situation is out-
weighed by the undue prejudice which its reception is likely to
cause.51 In like manner the favorable financial situation of a de-
fendant who is sued for damages in tort has very little if any relevance
and is rejected. But where his wrong subjects him to punitive dam-
ages, evidence of his wealth is relevant and receivable, for obviously
the imposition of a small financial penalty upon a man of wealth con-
stitutes but slight punishment.
52
Parol Evidence Rule: The Thayerian view that the parol evidence
rule is a rule of substantive law is accepted. Consequently, evidence
which violates the rule, though received without objection, cannot be
the basis of a finding. The rule does not apply where the parol evidence
would establish a claim of waiver or estoppel. But it does forbid the
use of such evidence to explain the meaning of an unambiguous writ-
ing. There is a conflict of authority upon the question whether a ne-
gotiable instrument is thus unambiguous in the following situation.
The first signature consists of the name of a corporation; underneath
this, the word "by" is followed by the name of an individual without
further designation or description; beneath the name of that individual,
but with not quite the same margin, is the name of a second individual
without designation or description. The Tennessee Court, adopting
the minority view, held the instrument unambiguous and reversed the
trial judge's finding, based on parol evidence, that the second individ-
48. Lee v. State, 254 S.W.2d 747 (Tenn. 1953).
49. Poston v. State, 256 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
50. Gray v. State, 250 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. 1952).
51. For a penetrating analysis of the problem, see Trautman, Logical or
Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 403 (1952).
52. Suzore v. Rutherford, 251 S.W.2d 129 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
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ual had signed, not as maker, but as an officer of the corporation5
Likewise evidence of an oral agreement that an instrument creating
an easement of way over a strip of land was intended to give the
grantee the right to exclusive possession of the strip was held in-
admissible. The instrument contained no provision as to possession.5
4
The reasoning in the decision of the Supreme Court in Brewing
Corp. of America v. Pioneer Distributing Co. 55 is completely out of
harmony with the generally accepted concepts as to the scope of the
rule. Two individuals executed a contract of guaranty which contained
a provision that it should continue in force until revoked by notice
sent by registered mail. In an action on the guaranty, one surety of-
fered to prove a parol release. The Court said: "To permit the de-
fendant Wilcox to prove that by a subsequent oral agreement, he was
released from the written contract of guaranty, while such contract
was left in force against his co-guarantor, Maddux, would clearly be to
permit the introduction of oral evidence to 'alter, modify and contra-
dict' the express terms of a written contract, and so a violation of the
parol evidence rule."56 The only case cited to support this statement
is not in point.57 Perhaps the subsequent oral agreement was un-
enforceable for lack of consideration or because within the Statute of
Frauds, but certainly the parol evidence rule has never been thought
to be effective to prevent the modification of a written contract by
subsequent oral contract.58
Former Judgments: In' an action to enjoin a liquor nuisance, de-
fendant offered to prove that he had been tried and acquitted of the
offense of making the sale of liquor which formed a basis for a finding
against him. The rejection of the evidence by the trial judge was ap-
proved by the Court of Appeals.59 This ruling is in accord with the
overwhelming weight of authority. But in the same case the judge re-
ceived over the defendant's objection "a certified copy of Mr. John-
son's [defendant's] record in the Police Court of Knoxville showing
he was fined many times for violation of municipal ordinances against
53. Lazarov v. Klyce, 255 S.W.2d 11 (Tenn. 1953). See the comment on this
case in the Interpretation section of the Contracts article and in the Parol Evi-
dence section of the Bills and Notes article.
54. Frumin v. May, 251 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
55. 253 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1952).
56. Id. at 762.
57. Klein v. Kern, 94 Tenn. 34, 28 S.W. 295 (1894).
58. The Court did not discuss the application of the statute to the agreement
in question. It may have involved difficult problems. See 2 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS §§ 591-594 (Rev. ed. 1936). The same authority has this to say about an
analogous misconception: "A failure to observe the reason why neither sealed
instruments nor contracts within the Statute of Frauds can be varied by oral
executory agreements has sometimes led to broad statements that written
contracts can be altered only by another written contract, or by an executed
oral agreement and the California Civil Code so provides, and the provision
has been copied in the statutes of a number of states." 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1828 (Rev. ed. 1938).
59. Johnson v. State, 257 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1950).
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,toring, transporting and possessing intoxicants." In affirming, the
Court cited only the statute making admissible evidence of defendant's
reputation. It is, of course, well settled that evidence of prior instances
of reprehensible conduct is inadmissible as tending to prove the dis-
position or character of a witness or party but that conviction of an
offense consisting of that conduct is admissible. Hence, if the statute
had'provided for the admissibility of evidence of defendant's charac-
tei, the decision might have been an application of a settled rule. But,
certainly, a record of a single conviction would hardly be admissible
evidence of reputation, although it might well have some logical rele-
Vance. Is the case to be explained on the theory that a police record
of many convictions is a vehicle of community reputation? Such theory
would probably accord with common experience in a small community,
and there was a time when the verdict of the jury on a matter of public
interest was regarded as involving reputation. But any modern case
reflecting such a notion is based on the long obsolete system whereby
jurors decided the issues submitted to them on their own knowledge
and not on the evidence introduced at the trial.60 Or should the refer-
ence to reputation be ignored and the convictions used as conclusive
evidence of the earlier offenses, proving defendant a common or
habitual liquor seller?61
Judicial Notice: The current cases dealing with this subject are of
the simplest sort. Chiefly, they are those in which the matter noticed
is so notorious as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute -so-
called matter of common knowledge: (1) that "moonshine liquor" is
illegally made whiskey, and that whiskey contains more than 5% alco-
hol;62 (2) that children play and run about on unfenced lawns abut-
ting on a highway so that motorists using the highway must be on
guard; 63 (3) that it is a universal custom for the maker of a promis-
sory note to sign the note at the right near the bottom of the face of
the note;64 and (4) that there is an over-all cost of maintaining trunk
sewer lines so that all users must contribute to pay it.65 The Supreme
Court has judically noticed that the town named in the warrant of a
justice of the peace was located in the county in which the suit was
brought.66 This may have been on the theory that the fact was no-
torious to men in the position of members of the Court or that it was
a matter capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort
to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.
60. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1593 (3d ed. 1940).
61. See 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 203 (3d ed. 1940).
62. Everhart v. State, 250 S.W.2d 368 (Tenn. 1952).
63. Hadley v. Morris, 249 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951).
64. Lazarov v. Klyce, 255 S.W.2d 11 (Tenn. 1953).
65. Cline v. Red Bank Utility Dist., 250 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. 1952).
66. Motors Ins. Corp. v. Lipford, 250 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1952).
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Weight and Credibility: Tennessee has apparently accepted the mi-
nority view that the uncontradicted testimony of an unimpeached wit-
ness must be accepted. In an action in which it was essential for
plaintiff to establish that she was rightly in the defendant's truck
assisting in unloading it, uncontradicted testimony of several unim-
peached witnesses that the driver was prohibited from permitting
others to enter the truck was held to be conclusive. Nothing was said
as to whether any one of them was interested or uninterested. 67 But,
where the proof of a fact depends solely on the testimony of a single
witness and it is self-contradictory, a finding of fact by the jury cannot
stand. This is particularly true where a fair interpretation of the testi-
mony tends to negative the fact.68
If the matter in question is one with respect to which a layman could
have no knowledge, expert testimony may be conclusive, but in other
situations a conflict between experts and laymen in their testimony
as to objective facts, such as the observable conduct of a person claim-
ing to be totally disabled, raises an issue to be decided by the trier .of
fact.6
9
Federal Decisions: In Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Bryan & Hewgley,
Inc.,70 the federal court of appeals held admissible an exhibit showing
the amount of merchandise in the warehouse in question five or six
months before the loss insured against. The court pointed out, that,
while it was inadmissible as evidence of the truth of the matters stated
in it, yet, since it had been prepared at the request of the defendant
company from original records, it was receivable as tending to .show
that the insured had kept books or records such as the policy required.
West v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. 71 involved the application of the
Tennessee statute of limitations to an action in the federal court. The
complaint had been filed within the statutory period and the summons
issued, but service upon one defendant had been held up, apparently
at the request of the plaintiff. Judge Taylor interpreted the Tennessee
statute and decisions as holding that the issuance of the summons, com-
menced the action and normally tolled the statute, that there was no
authority for delaying service of summons at the request of a part3
and that if service were thus delayed the issuance of the summons
would not constitute the commencement of the action so as to stop the
running of the statutory period.
67. Brooks v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, Inc., 255 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn.
App. W.S. 1952).
68. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 250 S.W.2d 781 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1951).
69. Henderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 250 S.W.2d 11 (Tenn. 1952)
70. 195 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1952).




Preferred Witness: In proving execution of a document which is
required to be attested, the attesting witnesses must first be called or
their unavailability shown. This rule is applicable to proof of execu-
tion of wills in Tennessee, but it does not confine the proponent's
evidence to the testimony of the attesters. Once the attesters have been
called or their absence properly accounted for, testimony of due execu-
tion from other witnesses is receivable, and it may justify a finding
even where the testimony of an attester is uncertain or adverse.72
Examination: When defendant in a criminal case takes the stand,
he is subject to cross-examination like any other witness. Thus, where
defendant, charged with the murder of a woman with whom he had
had illicit relations, introduced evidence tending to show himself a
faithful father and husband, the trial judge properly allowed extensive
cross-examination about his domestic affairs and about his arrest for
nonsupport of his wife and children.73 The defendant may be asked
whether he has not been previously convicted of offenses involving
moral turpitude for the purposes of affecting his credibility as a wit-
ness. That the evidence incidentally shows the commission of other
crimes does not prevent its reception.74
Privileged Communications: Husband and wife are competent to
testify against each other in both civil and criminal cases, but neither
may testify as to any matter that occurred between them by virtue of
or in consequence of the marital relationship.75 The prohibition is de-
signed to protect marital confidences. Hence, it has no application to
testimony of a wife that the defendant, her husband, jumped on her
in the home, beat her, chased her out of the house and followed her,
threatening to shoot her.
6
Effect of Failure to Call: No inference can be drawn against a party
for failure to call a witness not under his control and equally available
to his opponent. Thus, in an action on an insurance policy providing
benefits for total and permanent disability, failure of plaintiff to call
doctors from Vanderbilt Hospital who had treated him warranted no
unfavorable inference. 7
TRIAL
Jurisdiction over Person: In McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union of
America,78 the Court of Appeals held no longer applicable Tennessee
72. Miller v. Thrasher, 251 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
73. Helton v. State, 255 S.W.2d 694 (Tenn. 1953).
74. Gray v. State, 250 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. 1952); Everhart v. State, 250 S.W.2d
368 (Tenn. 1952).
75. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9777, 9778 (Williams 1934).
76. Dowdy v. State, 250 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. 1952).
77. Henderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 250 S.W.2d 11 (Tenn. 1952).
78. 254 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
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decisions based on Flexner v. Farson.9 Hence, service on the Secretary
of State in an action against a nonresident unincorporated association
doing business in Tennessee, as authorized by 1950 Code Supplement
section 8679.1,80 was effective to support a judgment enforceable
against the property of the association. In an action for divorce, where
jurisdiction to decree divorce was secured by constructive service, the
court has no power to make a decree for the support of the children
by the defendant.8' These cases reflect currently accepted doctrines.
82
Venue: A petition for change of venue by plaintiff must be made
promptly after discovering the cause for which it is sought. Otherwise,
a denial of the petition is not an abuse of the trial judge's discretion.
82
Right to Trial by Jury: The right to trial by jury in equity in Ten-
nessee is created by statute. It is not embodied in the Constitution.
Consequently, when a statute governing ouster of public officers pro-
vided that the procedure should be that of courts of chancery, the de-
fendant had no right to a jury trial. An act of 1933, amending the
statute, granted that right; the 1933 act was repealed by an act of 1937,
which in turn was repealed by an act of 1939. In Edwards v. State,84
defendant's demand for a jury was denied, and findings were made
against him. The Supreme Court held that the evidence was such that,
had there been a jury, the court must have directed a verdict against
Edwards. An erroneous denial of jury trial would, therefore, have
been without prejudice, and it was unnecessary to decide whether the
repealing act of 1939 revived the provision for jury trial in the act of
1933.
Challenge to the Array: The method of selection of citizens for duty
as jurors is sometimes provided by private act. The generally ac-
cepted doctrine in this country is that a substantial variance from the
method prescribed by statute makes the array subject to challenge.
The statutory objective is the prevention of possibility of manipulation
by the officials charged with the duty of furnishing the panel. It is
ordinarily true that the statutory details are held to be merely direc-
tory, but a disregard of the general plan is not tolerated. The Jury
Commission Law of Hamilton County provided that the commissioners
should obtain a list of qualified voters from the magistrates and, from
such lists and other reliable sources of information, should select the
names of the veniremen. Commissioners acting under this statute
received only four or five lists from the eleven magistrates and se-
79.. 248 U.S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, 63 L. Ed. 250 (1919).
80. TENN. CODE SUPP. § 8679.1 (1950).
81. Watkins v. Watkins, 254 S.W.2d 735 (Tenn. 1953); cf. May v. Anderson,
73 Sup. Ct. 840 (U.S. 1953).
82. See 6 VAND. L. REV. 783 (1953).
83. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Oakley, 249 S.W.2d 880 (Tenn. 1952).
84. 250 S.W.2d 19 (Tenn. 1952).
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lected 1200 names by using voting registration lists and by inquiring
"among their acquaintances, civic organizations and the like." The
Court held that the provisions of the statute were directory only and
that, in the absence of any suggestion of improper influence, the array
so selected was not subject to challenge.
8 5
Examination on Voir Dire: Where the action is one in which a party
may be carrying liability insurance, it is proper to ask jurors concern-
ing ownership of stock in a company writing such insurance. It is
said that the questions must be put in good faith, but how that good
faith or lack of it is to be made apparent is not explained.86
Objections during Trial: Where the fact of liability insurance is im-
properly disclosed to the jury during trial, the party prejudiced
thereby should immediately move for a mistrial. Even then, the trial
judge has some discretion in ruling on the motion. Certainly, the
complaining party cannot wait until moving for a new trial to make
known his objection and to demand appropriate action by the trial
judge.
87
Rulings on Evidence: When an objection to offered evidence is sus-
tained, the proponent must by appropriate action, such as an offer of
proof, make known the content of the offered evidence. If the record
on appeal does not contain the rejected evidence, the reviewing court
has no means of knowing whether the error prejudically affected the
result.88 When the objection is erroneously overruled in a jury case,
the error may ordinarily be cured by an instruction in the charge
directing the jury to disregard the objectionable testimony.89 And
where the trial is by a chancellor, the error will be harmless if he states
that he did not consider the testimony received under objection.0 0 The
generally accepted doctrine that the chancellor is not influenced by
incompetent evidence is interestingly illustrated in a case where an
action for breach of contract was begun before a jury which was later
discharged by agreement of the parties. While the jury was present,
objections made to the reception were overruled. These objections
were held not subject to review on appeal.91
Misconduct of Counsel: In a prosecution of a Negro defendant for
the murder of a Negro, the prosecutor, in examining a white character
85. Helton v. State, 255 S.W.2d 694 (Tenn. 1953).
86. City Water Co. v. Butler, 251 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
87. Logwood v. Nelson, 250 S.W.2d 582 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
88. Turner v. Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp., 251 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1952).
89. Central Truckaway System, Inc. v. Waltner, 253 S.W.2d 985 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1952).
90. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Mander, 253 S.W.2d 994 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1952).
91. Tennessee Handle Co. v. Builders Supply Co., 255 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. App.
M.S. 1952).
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witness testifying for defendant, threatened to indict him for perjury
and, in arguing to the jury, referred to the disgrace it brought upon a
county to have white men testify as character witnesses for a Negro.
The Supreme Court held that the attempted coercion of a witness and
the appeal to race prejudice required a reversal of the judgment of
conviction. The Court left no doubt of its strong disapproval of such
conduct.92
Motion for Nonsuit or Dismissal: If a motion for a peremptory in-
struction at the close of the plaintiff's evidence is erroneously denied,
the error is waived when defendant thereafter proceeds to introduce
evidence.93 This is the well-accepted doctrine in practically all juris-
dictions. The Tennessee cases abound with statements of the estab-
lished rule that, in passing upon a motion for a peremptory instruction
or for a nonsuit or directed verdict, at whatever stage made, the trial
judge must consider the evidence in favor of the opponent in the light
most favorable to him. When there is credible evidence which, if be-
lieved, would justify a verdict in his favor, the motion should be
denied.94
Requests to Charge and Charges: It is well settled that, in consider-
ing alleged errors in the judge's instructions to the jury, the charge
is to be considered as a whole and the instruction complained of will
be reversible error only where it is likely to mislead the jury on a ma-
terial matter.95 Each portion of the charge is to be construed as part
of the whole and not in isolation.96 The text writers agree that the
charge should cover all the chief matters in issue. It has been held
that, if an issue not made by the pleadings is tried without objection,
it is properly submitted to the jury.9 7 This rule prevails in most code
states.
Refusal to give a requested instruction is not error, if the instruc-
tion is not accurately phrased 98 or if the requested proposition is sub-
stantially covered in the general charge.99 When the charge as given is
attacked as insufficiently detailed or as subject to misinterpretation or
92. Manning v. State, 257 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1953).
93. (Blue) Star Service, Inc. v. McCurdy, 251 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1952).
94. Henderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 250 S.W.2d 11 (Tenn. 1952); Central
Truckaway System, Inc. v. Waltner, 253 S.W.2d 985 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952);
France v. Newman, 248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951). In this connection,
attention should be given to TENN. CODE ANN. § 10622 (Williams 1934) with
reference to de novo trials in the Court of Appeals where the trial below was
without a jury.
95. All v. John Gerber Co., 252 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952); Miller v.
Thrasher, 251 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
96. Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 250 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
97. France v. Newman, 248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
98. All v. John Gerber Co., 252 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
99. Miller v. Thrasher, 251 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952); Act-O-Lane
Gas Service Co. v. Hall, 248 S.W.2d 398 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951); France v.
Newman, 248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
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as confusing, it is incumbent upon counsel to request additional or
clarifying instructions; and this is particularly true where the judge
inquires whether counsel has further requests or objections.100
Deliberation of Jury: It is misconduct of the jury to discuss or con-
sider the amount of attorney's fees which a party will have to pay or
the probability that the defendant is protected by liability insurance,
but such misconduct does not necessarily require that the verdict be
set aside.1 1
Verdict: The provisions of Code section 8824102 have incidental salu-
tary consequences. If a single count in a declaration is good and is
supported by evidence, a general verdict for the plaintiff will stand and
an erroneous refusal to direct a verdict on counts not supported by
evidence will be harmless. The effect of the statute is to interpret a
general verdict for the plaintiff as a finding in his favor on every
count.103
Judgment: When judgment is entered, it is to be construed like any
other document so as to give full effect, if possible, to every word and
make its several parts consistent, effective and reasonable.104
MOTION FOR A NEw TRIAL
Time for Making: Section 8980 of the 1950 supplemental Code'05
provides that a motion for a new trial shall be made only within 30
days from the decree, verdict or judgment in question, subject to rules
of court prescribing the time, but the rules may not allow less than
ten days. The termination of the term of court does not shorten the
time. If the motion is not made within the time prescribed, the court
has no jurisdiction to entertain it, although, if filed in time, it may
be argued and considered later.106
Grounds: The few cases reaching the appellate courts during the
period under consideration exhibit no unusual features. And the
treatment by the reviewing courts is orthodox,107 except for the de-
100. See Jones v. State, 253 S.W.2d 740 (Tenn. 1952); Poston v. State, 256
S.W.2d 63 (Term. App. E.S. 1952); All v. John Gerber Co., 252 S.W.2d 138
(Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
101. France v. Newman, 248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
102. TE Nm. CODE A-m. § 8824 (Williams 1934).
103. Central Truckaway System, Inc. v. Waltner, 253 S.W.2d 985 (Tenn.
App. E.S. 1952).
104. Branch v. Branch, 249 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
105. TENN. CODE SuPP. § 8980 (1950)
106. Suzore v. Rutherford, 251 S.W.2d 129 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
107. Fran-e v. Newman, 248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951) (misconduct
of jury in discussing liability insurance or amount of attorney's fees); Johnson
v. McCord, 251 S.W.2d 144 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952) (same, as to unauthorized
view by two jurors); Logwood v. Nelson, 250 S.W.2d 582 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1952) (incidental disclosure of liability insurance); Searcy v. Simmons, 250
S.W.2d 109 (Term. App. M.S. 1951) (surprise at testimony of adverse witness
fully cross-examined). In all cases, motion was denied.
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cisions dealing with the functions and duty of the trial judge where
the ground of motion is the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
verdict. In these, the courts have applied the rule which is well set-
tled in Tennessee but which has not been found elsewhere in a reason-
ably thorough search of authorities.
"The rule in this state is firmly established that the trial court shall
exercise the function of a thirteenth juror upon hearing of a motion for
a new trial .... ,1 08 Consequently, when the trial judge in passing upon
such motion said, "In these cases where the evidence is in sharp con-
flict the Court,does not feel that he has a right to interfere with the
verdict of the jury, and overrules the motions," the Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.10 9 Where the trial
judge makes no statement concerning his conception of his duty to
weigh the evidence or phrases his comment so that the appellate court
considers it less than an affirmative disclaimer of having exercised his
judgment as a thirteenth juror, his order denying a new trial will be
affirmed." 0 The Tennessee doctrine is clearly set forth in State ex rel.
Richardson v. Kenner,"' in which the Court again quotes with ap-
proval a manuscript decision in Durant v. State, decided in 1925.
There, the Court reversed the trial judge, who said that he was glad
that he did not have to decide upon the guilt of the defendant or the
credibility of the witnesses. The Supreme Court declared that this
was exactly what he had to do and that he must grant a new trial
unless he found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recently held
that the thirteenth-juror rule is not to be applied in a United States
district court sitting in Tennessee." 2 The appellant was insisting that
the verdict was so excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice and
to require a new trial as to damages and apparently argued that the
Tennessee rule should be applied in considering either the granting
of a new trial or the ordering of a remittitur. It seems to be well set-
tled in Tennessee that the thirteenth-juror rule does not apply where
the disapproval of the judge is limited to the excessiveness of the
verdict. "[W]here the trial judge has simply expressed his disapproval
of the verdict as being excessive, yet has refused to set it aside, this
[Supreme] Court will not, alone upon the ground of such disapproval
or dissatisfaction with the amount of the verdict, grant a new trial.""
3
It would be unprofitable to speculate whether the doctrine of Erie
108. McLaughlin v. Broyles, 255 S.W.2d 1020, 1023 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
109. Ibid.
110. Central Truckaway System, Inc. v. Waltner, 253 S.W.2d 985 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1952).
111. 172 Tenn. 34, 109 S.W.2d 95 (1937).
112. Werthan Bag Corp. v. Agnew, 202 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1953).
113. Tennessee Coal & R.R. v. Roddy, 85 Tenn. 400, 409, 5 S.W. 286, 290
(1887); accord, Third Nat. Bank v. American Equitable Ins. Co., 27 Tenn. App.
249, 178 S.W.2d 915 (M.S. 1943).
19531 1153
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Railroad v. Thompkcins would be held applicable to the division of
functions between judge and jury where the thirteenth-juror rule is
involved.
It is interesting to note the control which the judge maintains over
the action of the jury in view of the accepted doctrine that he must
not comment upon the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the
witnesses in his charge and especially in view of the rule that the jury
in criminal cases determines both the law and the facts.
APPEAL AND ERROR
What is Appealable? In a criminal case, an appeal lies only from a
final judgment. Consequently, rulings striking out defenses of an-
other action pending and former judgment and former jeopardy are
not appealable.1 4 They are, of course, reviewable on an appeal from
the final judgment and are, therefore, not reviewable by certiorari." 5
In equity, under section 9038 of the Code," 6 the chancellor may, in
his discretion, allow an appeal from decrees which do not finally dis-
pose of the controversy before him. Thus, he may grant an appeal from
a finding of liability although he has ordered a reference to fix the
amount." 7 And a habeas corpus proceeding for the determination of
the right to the custody of a child is regarded as a proceeding in equity
in so far as the chancellor's power to allow a discretionary appeal is
involved." 8 On appeal, the chancellor's discretionary taxation of costs
is reviewable only on the ground that it is arbitrary or capricious." 9
A judgment in favor of a party which grants less than he demanded
is appealable by him, but the errors reviewable are only those errors
which affect the amount or extent of recovery.120
To Which Court? Although appeal from the circuit or chancery
court lies to the Supreme Court in cases involving the right to hold a
public office, an appeal in a suit brought against a mayor of a town to
recover from him money unlawfully paid to him as mayor, to dismiss
him from office and to adjudge him ineligible to hold that office for
ten years lies only to the Court of Appeals. The Court gave no ex-
planation as to why the suit did not involve the right to hold a public
office. It seemed to place reliance almost wholly upon former cases in
which the appeal was uniformly to the Court of Appeals and in which
no question of that Court's jurisdiction was raised.'
21
114. Allen v. State, 250 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn. 1952).
115. Helton v. State, 250 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. 1952).
116. TENx. CODE ANN. § 9038 (Williams 1934).
117. Brewing Corp. of America v. Pioneer Distributing Co., 253 S.W.2d 761
(Tenn. 1952).
118. State ex rel. Bolden v. Woodring, 254 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn. 1953).
119. Young v. Jones, 255 S.W.2d 703 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
120. All v. John Gerber Co., 252 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
121. Crass v. Walls, 253 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1952).
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In a recent case,122 the Court of Appeals was able, because of the
peculiar situation, to avoid determining which of two appeals from a
county court is to be given priority. An appeal from an order fixing
an attorney's fees for services rendered to an estate was taken to the
chancery court by one party. Thereafter, an appeal to the circuit
court was taken by the other party. The clerk of the county court
sent the record to the chancery court; the other party's petition for
certiorari to compel the clerk to send the record to the circuit court
was denied on the ground that the appeal first in time was to be pre-
ferred. By reason of illness of the chancellor, the circuit judge had
been appointed special chancellor, and so he would hear the appeal in
whichever court it was pending. The Court of Appeals held that, for
this reason, it was immaterial whether he acted as chancellor or as
circuit judge.
Formal Requisites: Although an appeal in the nature of a writ of
error is a matter of right, a prayer for the allowance of an appeal and
the allowance are required, and if the technical record does not show
the prayer and allowance, the appeal will be dismissed. The failure of
the minutes to record this useless formality is not necessarily fatal
to a review by the appellate court, for the aggrieved party may proceed
by writ of error after his appeal has been dismissed. And, as was most
sensibly done in State v. Hobbs,123 the appellate court may, in its dis-
cretion, treat the abortive appeal as if it were a writ of error, where
the record satisfies the conditions prescribed for such a writ.
The statutory provision as to the time for praying an appeal and for
filing the bond or pauper's oath is mandatory. The appellate court has
no power to permit a bond to be filed after the expiration of the pre-
scribed time, though it may allow the correction or amendment of a
defective bond timely filed.124 Similarly, the time for petitioning the
Supreme Court for certiorari is mandatory, and neither a justice of the
Court nor the Court itself has power to entertain a petition after the
prescribed period has elapsed.1
As to the amount of the bond on appeal, Code section 904312 provides
that it must cover "the whole debt, damages, and costs" in certain
actions, including those on "written obligations for the delivery of
specific articles." In Julian Engineering Co. v. R. J. and C. W. Fletcher,
Inc.,127 the plaintiff sought the recovery of a chattel, sold to defendant
on a conditional sale contract, for default in payment of part of the
unpaid purchase price represented by a promissory note. The Court
122. McClure v. Wade, 253 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1952).
123. 250 S.W.2d 549 (Tenn. 1952).
124. England v. Young, 155 Tenn. 506, 296 S.W. 14 (1927).
125. Parham v. Beasley, 251 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. 1952); Smith v. Memphis, 249
S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. 1952).
126. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9043 (Williams 1934).
127. 253 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. 1952).
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interpreted the statute as applicable only where the judgment or de-
cree was for the payment of a sum of money. Hence, a motion of
plaintiff to dismiss the appeal by defendant from a decree awarding
repossession to plaintiff was denied, though defendant's bond covered
only costs.
Record on Appeal: Tennessee preserves the distinction between the
technical record and the record of proceedings which must be em-
bodied in a bill of exceptions. Thus, if the technical record contains
a plea in abatement and a ruling by the trial judge on its sufficiency
as a matter of law, the ruling may be reviewed without a bill of ex-
ceptions, but if the whole record indicates expressly or by implication
that the ruling was one of fact based on evidence, a bill of exceptions
is essential. 128 And the bill of exceptions must have been filed within
the time fixed by the trial judge within the limit set by the statute;
otherwise it cannot be considered part of the record.129 Where there
is an apparent conflict between the court's minutes, which are part of
the technical record, and the bill of exceptions, a careful analysis is
essential. In Gray v. State, 30 the minutes recited a plea in abatement
to the indictment alleging an illegal selection of grand jurors but con-
tained no entry showing any disposition of the motion. The bill of
exceptions, the Supreme Court held, could not be examined to supply
the ruling as a basis for an assignment of error. On the other hand, in
Helton v. State,'31 the minute entry revealed an exception taken by
defendant to a ruling of the trial judge in discharging a juror for al-
legedly insufficient reason. The Supreme Court, citing only Percer v.
State, 32 said that "under such circumstances the bill of exceptions
controls."' 33 In the Percer case, the minutes recited the presence of
defendant at the reception of the verdict, but the bill of exceptions set
forth a motion for a new trial upon the hearing of which the evidence
disclosed facts which did not satisfy the requisites of presence. The
Gray case is easily explained for the reason that there can be no action
on or relief from a judgment until it is rendered and its form on the
minute entry is conclusive. Furthermore, the minute entry is not
conclusive where the bill of exceptions shows that it has been posi-
tively disapproved,134 as in the Percer case. Can it be properly said
that an omission in a bill of exceptions is a positive disapproval of a
minute entry, or does the failure to repeat the exception in the bill
128. Motors Ins. Corp. v. Lipford, 250 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1952).
129. Hamilton v. Wolfe, 250 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1952).
130. 250 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. 1952). Incidentally, it should be noted that the
minutes are not, except in cases of ambiguity, to be explained by extraneous
evidence. Gregory v. Trousdale County, 254 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1953).
131. 255 S.W.2d 694 (Tenn. 1953). See the comment on this case in the
Former Jeopardy section of the Criminal Law and Procedure article.
132. 118 Tenn. 765, 103 S.W. 780 (1907).
133. 255 S.W.2d at 697.
134. Waller v. Skelton, 186 Tenn. 433, 211 S.W.2d 445 (1948).
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prevent an assignment of error on the ruling, or is the explanation
that the ruling was not treated as strictly a matter of law but as one
based on evidence of the juror's qualification?'3 5
If the judgment appealed from is based on a jury verdict, the record
must show that the errors assigned were specified in the required
motion for a new trial as well as in the bill of exceptions. 1 And if the
error assigned is insufficiency of evidence, the bill must contain all
the evidence. 37 In an appeal in a divorce action, the finding of the
chancellor is entitled to great weight when he has seen and heard the
witnesses, particularly where the determination depends largely upon
the comparative credibility of the parties.138 If there has been more
than one trial and the errors relied on occurred in an earlier trial, they
must be contained in a wayside bill of exceptions. In such a situation,
the exceptions in the wayside bill will be considered first on the
appeal. 3 9
The errors revealed in a bill of exceptions, to be reversible, must
affirmately appear to have prejudically affected the substantial rights
of the appellant. Thus, an exception based upon the improper exclu-
sion of evidence must show the content of rejected evidence.140 Mis-
conduct of two jurors in taking an unauthorized view is not of itself
sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial,141 nor is a probability
of improper discussion by the jury of the amount of attorneys fees
a party will probably have to pay.1 In like manner, the remarks of
the trial judge in ruling upon objections to evidence will not be ground
for reversal where they are not shown to have had a prejudicial ef-
fect.143 Indeed, the courts insist that they will not reverse unless they
are satisfied from the whole record that the alleged errors caused
substantial harm.144 It is needless to add that it is extremely difficult
for counsel to predict whether the court in a given situation will con-
sider the error or combination of errors sufficiently harmful to war-
rant reversal.
135. The opinion in the Helton case does not make it clear whether the whole
record showed that the ruling on the belated challenge to the juror was based
on the evidence. The Court seems to assume that as a matter of law appellant's
contention that the challenge came too late was sound.
136. Carter County v. Street, 252 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
137. State v. Terry, 253 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1952).
138. Troutt v. Troutt, 250 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
139. See Act-O-Lane Gas Service Co. v. Hall, 248 S.W.2d 398 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1951).
140. Turner v. Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp., 251 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1952).
141. Johnson v. McCord, 251 S.W.2d 144 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
142. France v. Newman, 248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
143. Searcy v. Simmons, 250 S.W.2d 109 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1951).
144. Carter County v. Street, 252 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952). See
also Dowdy v. State, 250 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. 1952). As to the trial court's judg-
ment when a remittitur is questioned, see All v. John Gerber Co., 252 S.W.2d
138, 143 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952): "'There is an added weight to the judgment
of the trial court when, as here, the circuit judge, by way of remittitur, re-
duced the amount of the damage fixed by the jury.'
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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
It goes without saying that a judgment on a verdict approved by the
trial judge and supported by material evidence will not be disturbed
on appeal1 45 and that an assignment of error not argued in the ap-
pellant's brief will be deemed abandoned.146
MISCELLANEOUS
Power and Function of Grand Jury: In Hayslip v. State,147 the Su-
preme Court thoroughly considered the inquisitorial powers of the
grand jury in Tennessee and its authority to state in its report the
reasons for failing to find true bills in a matter under investigation.
.The members of the Court agreed that it was entirely proper for the
grand jury to report that it found the accusations investigated to be
entirely baseless, that no witness testified to any fact that would war-
rant an indictment and that an independent investigation revealed no
evidence of the alleged wrongdoing. But there was sharp disagree-
ment as to the propriety of including in the report statements reflect-
ing upon the conduct of the complaining witness.
Mrs. Hayslip had made public accusations of the existence of grossly
immoral practices in certain public schools. The school authorities
properly requested that the grand jury investigate them. The jury
reported that the accusations were without foundation in fact and that
the evidence tended to show affirmatively that the alleged practices
did not exist. The report stated that the jury had heard Mrs. Hayslip
in full and contained the following: "It is our opinion that her con-
tinued employment in the City Schools would be unadvisable and a
disservice to the community .... We cannot escape the conclusion
that the Treadwell School has been viciously maligned by the un-
founded charges of Mrs. Maurine D. Hayslip."
Mrs. Hayslip moved to have these statements expunged. The trial
judge denied the motion. The majority of the Supreme Court affirmed.
They agreed with the Chief Justice that the grand jury "will not be
permitted to single out persons in civil or official positions to impugn
their motives, or by word, imputation or innuendo hold them to scorn
or criticism.' 1 48 But they held that one who has been the moving party
in bringing about the investigation cannot object to matter which
sharply criticizes him for making the charges. The Chief Justice in a
vigorous dissent pointed out that this doctrine exposes every citizen
who testifies before a grand jury to the danger that he may be publicly
condemned without opportunity to defend himself.
145. Rogers v. McDaniel, 253 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
146. Todd v. Roane-Anderson Co., 251 S.W.2d 132 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
147. 249 S.W.2d 882 (Tenn. 1952).
148. Id. at 884.
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